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Abstract
This article addresses the role of counterfactuals in historical and ethnohistorical
explanation. Drawing primarily on examples from the Conquest of Mexico, it argues
(1) for a useful role for counterfactual analysis, not in writing fiction, but in assessing
pivotal causation and proofing causal arguments; (2) for a clearer understanding of
causation in historical records, especially of ethnohistorical subjects; and (3) for a way
in which this perspective can be employed to argue for solidly grounded revisionist
interpretations of events.
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On 13 August 1521, the Aztec emperor, Cuauhtemoc, surrendered to Hernan Cortés
amidst the ruins of Tenochtitlan after months of devastating battles. This event marked
the end of the autonomous development of one of the world’s great civilizations and
ushered in an era of catastrophic depopulation, indigenous subordination, and civiliza-
tional demise. What allowed Cortés to undertake this campaign was the political author-
ization and financial support of Governor Diego Velásquez de Cuéllar of Cuba. The
governor, however, had grown suspicious and decided to remove him from command,
but, forewarned, Cortés sailed just before Velásquez reached the harbor (Díaz del Castillo,
1977, Vol. 1: 81; López de Gómara, 1965–6, Vol. 2: 21).
But what would the course of Mesoamerican history have been had the governor
acted more quickly and replaced Cortés with a captain who would more faithfully
follow his orders to explore but not to settle or march inland? Would the Aztecs have
continued in power, would the depopulation of the 16th century have been avoided
or had its impact otherwise muted, and might there still be an Aztec-derived state in
Mexico, with all the changes this would have meant for the subsequent course of world
history?
What makes these valid, useful, or even interesting questions to ask, especially for an
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anthropologist? The growing historicization of anthropology (e.g., Carmack, 1972: 228;
Faubion, 1993: 35–44; Krech, 1991; Schwerin, 1976: 323) has made such issues increas-
ingly significant for the discipline, yet at the same time, there is all too often a tendency
to treat history as simply an anecdotal illustration of a larger theoretical point, as just
another variable, or as a convenient backdrop against which to situate more conventional
ethnography. There are, however, critical issues in and about the past for which an
anthropological perspective can be particularly useful, especially in studies of non-
Western peoples (Simmons, 1988: 2; Trigger, 1975: 51, 1982: 2). But attempts so to use
it have often been marked by inadequate methodological training in carrying out his-
torical inquiry, thereby frequently yielding unsatisfactory results (Carmack, 1972: 232;
DeMallie, 1977: 78–9; Euler, 1972: 202; Lévi-Strauss, 1963: 1). And I would suggest
that this failure has been one of the reasons that many anthropologists, dissatisfied with
the prevailing interpretations, have turned away from causal analysis and sought answers
in meanings, even though they do acknowledge that actions have causes (e.g., Geertz,
1983: 34). But whether meaning yields a better understanding of actions than causal
forces, both approaches – meaning and cause – rest on an initial historical assessment
that, if fundamentally flawed, will invariably yield an inadequate interpretation, and the
meaning approach has little internal basis for correcting such errors. So the fundamental
concern here is, how can better historical analyses be achieved, especially from an
anthropological perspective?
Though typically ignored and by no means a complete panacea, counterfactual analy-
sis provides an excellent basis for critically examining historical causes, regardless of the
subsequent theoretical stance adopted. And the approach advocated here is, first, the use
of counterfactual analysis, both of itself to strengthen causal arguments and, second, to
delineate explicitly its elements as the basis for revisionist interpretations.
I. COUNTERFACTUALS
The fundamental question underlying counterfactual speculation is whether past events
could have taken a different course than the one they did, with the answer having impli-
cations for both historical and ethnographic research. While the response to this ques-
tion is necessarily hypothetical, a counterfactual approach attempts to show plausible
instances in which the road not taken very well could have been, with significant con-
sequences for the subsequent course of history, whether the ending point of interest is
the past or today. One goal, then, is to use counterfactual analysis to ‘proof ’ one’s
interpretation by altering the presumed cause and attempting to determine whether or
not the outcome would be changed as a result.
Attempting to write counterfactual history essentially adopts the realist position that
the past is fixed and certain (Kuzminski, 1979; Walsh, 1977) though its interpretation
is not, nor need it be considered as determined (Ferguson, 1997). A constructionist
position, in which the past is taken to be uncertain and wholly dependent upon one’s
interpretative stance (Goldstein, 1977; Nowell-Smith, 1977), leaves little room for
counterfactual analysis, or perhaps, more cynically, it could be argued that these pos-
itions are inherently counterfactual and substantiate the plausibility of investigating
such alternatives. While events can be taken as fixed after the fact from a realist per-
spective, history as it is being made is inherently contingent. When people are actu-
ally faced with course-altering decisions, many factors influence which one is chosen,
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but the fact that one is ultimately selected over the others does not obscure the reality
that many different alternatives are or were available. After selecting one course of
action, the alternatives effectively become counterfactual, but at the time the choice is
made, a world of possibilities is open. That is, life as it is lived is contingent and not
nearly as determined as either ex post facto ethnographic accounts or the historical
record would suggest.
When faced with a choice, one of many alternatives is selected and so becomes his-
torical reality. The alternative courses of action were, nevertheless, to varying degrees,
plausible and viable; they were not simply fanciful events, but potential realities that did
not come to be. And it is precisely that the paths not trodden are considered that makes
them reasonable counterfactuals. Counterfactuals are plausibilities before the action was
taken that fixed the subsequent sequence of events. Counterfactuals are thus not fantasy
alternatives but considered choices in light of probable consequences, rather than
unknowable ones.
Although the explicit writing of counterfactual history is not common, the intellec-
tual exercise is. In the here-and-now, we all think counterfactually – not in the sense of
projected possible courses of action in the past, but rather in the present weighing of
alternatives, all except one of which will ultimately become counterfactuals. Were it
otherwise, we would never recognize choices.
II. CAUSALITY
However entertaining the construction of counterfactuals may be, the goal of the exer-
cise is not simply to create alternative fictional scenarios, but to focus more closely on
the nature of causality in both ethnographic and historical explanation. Constructing a
compelling counterfactual account depends on identifying the proximate cause in the
traditional narrative, the pivotal event without which the known overall sequence of
events would not have occurred. For example, if I consider the Spaniards’ possession of
firearms as crucial to their conquest of Mexico, imagining a plausible way to neutralize
these weapons should reverse the outcome. Thus, if the battle at Tlaxcallan had con-
tinued for a few more days, the Spaniards’ entire supply of gunpowder would have been
exhausted, effectively depriving them of their firearms thereafter and insuring their
defeat. But altering an event that then does not substantially change the outcome illus-
trates an erroneous choice, as what was identified as the cause was then clearly not
crucial. For instance, since the Spaniards abandoned their cannons during the flight from
Tenochtitlan on 30 June 1520, yet returned to attack again, and since they also ran out
of powder in the final weeks of the Conquest, but pursued their campaign to a success-
ful conclusion, it does not appear that firearms were, in fact, essential. So while the initial
theory of the pivotal significance of firearms seemed reasonable, other data suggest that
reconceiving subsequent events in the absence of guns would not crucially alter the
course of events as we know them. This, then, forces us to reconsider what is actually
explanatory in the historical account. And while this counterfactual experiment failed,
having considered it has sharpened our awareness of what was actually causal and
significant.
I can easily draw other examples of counterfactuals from the Conquest of Mexico
where a slight change here or there could have drastically altered the outcome. For
instance, once Cortés had achieved the initial exploratory goals of the expedition, many
HASSIG Counterfactuals and revisionism in historical explanation
59
04 Hassig (JB/D)  15/2/01 3:45 pm  Page 59
 at UNIV OF OKLAHOMA on January 20, 2016ant.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
members of his crew wanted to return to Cuba and threatened to revolt; Cortés suc-
cessfully thwarted the incipient rebellion by trying some of the ringleaders for treason
and sentencing several to death (Aguilar, 1977: 68–9; Cortés, 1963: 51–3; Díaz del
Castillo, 1977, Vol. 1: 174–80; Hassig, 1994: 72–5; López de Gómara, 1965–6, Vol. 3:
85–6; Tapia, 1950: 43–4). Had the rebels succeeded, however, Cortés’s numbers would
have been so reduced that the expedition into the interior would most likely not have
happened. Similarly, once he began the march inland, Cortés encountered and fought
the Tlaxcaltecs and was on the verge of defeat when the four rulers of that confederacy
decided to ally with him to strengthen their own positions in the context of an internal
power struggle (Cervantes de Salazar, 1914: 240; López de Gómara, 1965–6, Vol. 3: 97;
Martínez Baracs and Sempat, 1994: 89–90, 197–8; Muñoz Camargo, 1984: 38, 66,
180–1, 271–5; Torquemada, 1975–83, Vol. 1: 275, Vol. 5: 299); had they decided other-
wise, Cortés and his men would likely all have been killed. Similarly, Governor Diego
Velásquez de Cuéllar sent a much larger expedition to capture Cortés and return him to
Cuba for trial. Cortés defeated the opposing force, primarily through treachery (Aguilar,
1977: 84–5; Cortés, 1963: 81–9; Demanda, 1971, Vol. 1: 437–44; Díaz del Castillo,
1977, Vol. 1: 333–79; Hassig, 1994: 90–1; López de Gómara, 1965–6, Vol. 2: 181–92;
Muñoz Camargo, 1966: 216; 1984: 251; Oviedo y Valdés, 1959, Vol. 4: 52–60; Tapia,
1950: 76–82), but had its leader, Pánfilo de Narváez, been less gullible, his superior force
could easily have captured Cortés and put an end to the entire expedition. Finally, there
was another attempted rebellion by the Spaniards in the Valley of Mexico that Cortés
again put down by hanging the leader (Díaz del Castillo, 1977, Vol. 1: 493–5; López
de Gómara, 1965–6, Vol. 3: 229), one that also might have succeeded and ended the
expedition.
Given the many possible counterfactual alternatives, on what basis can one be argued
to be more plausible than another since none in fact actually happened? The answer is
that the best counterfactual is the one that requires the fewest changes to produce an
altered sequence of events. Altering more than one variable introduces so many alterna-
tive consequences that the projected causal chain becomes so complex that it is difficult
to establish a single plausible line of reasoning.
Among those that are not compelling counterfactuals are changes that fundamentally
reorder the reality that is historically known. For instance, a counterfactual Mexico in
which the Aztecs had organized their imperial alliance system in an altogether different
manner that would have allowed them to repulse the Spaniards permanently would
produce a result contrary to that which is historically known. But it would also funda-
mentally alter Aztec society in ways that could not easily be foreseen, and so Aztec actions
in the face of a Spanish threat could not be convincingly predicted. Altering fundamental
conditions yields circumstances that are known, or knowable, to all and affect everyone’s
actions accordingly.1 To illustrate, it might be said that the D-day invasion would have
failed had there been clouds over coastal France because this would have hindered allied
air support and allowed the Germans to move their armor to counter the landings. And
this may be a cogent analysis, if the presence of overcast skies were the only variable
changed from actual D-day events. However, weather is a condition that is generally
known, and both sides would have adjusted their behavior accordingly, so this example
actually changes multiple variables, which makes its use in analysis vastly more difficult.
Another inadequate counterfactual is one that changes a circumstance so that it alters
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the outcome of a particular situation, yet does not fundamentally alter the course of
events as we know it. For instance, if Cortés had been killed during the Conquest of
Mexico, his entire campaign would probably have been thwarted. But if only Cortés had
been killed, leaving the bulk of his force intact, and it had returned reinforced under
alternative leadership, intent on conquest, eliminating Cortés would not have achieved
a permanent shift in circumstances. A counterfactual change that cannot achieve more
than an incidental shift in the course of events is not worth consideration except to
demonstrate the improbability of one possible course of action, or to illustrate that this
particular point in history was not pivotal.
The type of counterfactual that allows the most plausible alternative argument is one
that alters a decision or changes an event in a way that would have been unpredictable
by all of the participants. In the case of a counterfactual that rests on the decision of a
single leader, the general alternatives may be known or suspected by everyone, but until
a choice is made, its consequences have little or no effect on others. For instance, at one
point in World War II, invading Normandy was merely one of several alternative courses
of action. But once the Allies made their choice, it affected all subsequent behavior. Had
they chosen another site, that decision would likewise have altered allied efforts in a
manner tailored to that location. But in such a case, where a single person or small group
of people are entrusted to make the decision and empowered to carry it into effect, only
the deciding actor(s) know(s) the course of action to be followed until it is revealed or
carried out, and other parties, such as the enemy, will not be aware of it and adjust their
own actions accordingly.
Counterfactuals that depend on altering an historically known course of action allow
the construction of more convincing arguments than those that require opening up
heretofore unconsidered possibilities. For example, because Cortés personally held his
band of Spaniards together, killing him in a plausible manner and circumstance would
most likely have led to consequences that would have thwarted the Conquest as we know
it by bringing about the death of many of his followers and the end of his expedition.
The example that best illustrates this in the case of the Conquest, and best fits the
minimal rewrite rule, occurred during the Tlacopan causeway battle.
Six weeks into the siege of the Aztec capital of Tenochtitlan, Cortés led his forces across
one of the causeways leading from the lake shore to the city.The Spaniards had been fight-
ing their way along this causeway since late May, 1521, in a series of seizures and with-
drawals, assailed by troops in front and soldiers in canoes on each side. Much of the
fighting centered on large gaps created by the removal of wooden bridges, opposite which
the Aztecs built barricades. On 30 June, Cortés and his men fought their way across several
such breaches and, appearing to push the Aztecs back, crossed another. In pursuit of the
fleeing Aztecs, the Spaniards neglected to fill in the gap, despite Cortés’s earlier orders to
do so. The flight was a feint and once Cortés and his allies crossed the breach, the Aztecs
counterattacked. The Spaniards were pushed back against the gap in disarray, Cortés was
wounded in the leg and seized by four Aztecs who were dragging him off when Cristóbal
de Olea came to the rescue, killed the four who held Cortés, and freed him, though at
the cost of his own life. Cortés escaped, but 68 other Spaniards were taken captive and
many more were killed (Aguilar, 1977: 96; Díaz del Castillo, 1977, Vol. 3: 33, 53; Durán,
1967, Vol. 3: 565–6; Ixtlilxóchitl, 1975–7, Vol. 1: 472–3; López de Gómara, 1965–6,
Vol. 2: 262–3; Oviedo y Valdés, 1959, Vol. 4: 133; Sahagún, 1975: 104; 1989: 121).
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Ten of the Spaniards were immediately sacrificed at the Great Temple and their
severed heads were sent to the battlefront and thrown into the Spanish lines. And that
night, from their camps, Cortés’s men could hear the drums from the Great Temple and
see the other captured Spaniards being made to dance in front of the god Huitzilopochtli
before their hearts were cut out in divine sacrifice. The faces were flayed, tanned, and –
beards attached – sent to the Aztecs’ tributary towns as a warning (Cortés, 1963: 241–2;
Díaz del Castillo, 1977, Vol. 3: 34–6; Ixtlilxóchitl, 1975–7, Vol. 1: 472–3; López de
Gómara, 1965–6, Vol. 2: 262–3; Oviedo y Valdés, 1959, Vol. 4: 133).
In the wake of this success, most of the Indians allied with the Spaniards left, and the
Aztecs besieged the Spanish camps for the next four days. But Cortés held his men
together, adopted a defensive posture where his weapons could be used to best effect,
weathered the onslaught, and, when his Indian allies saw that the Spaniards had not
been defeated, they came back, the tide of battle turned, and the Conquest continued
(Díaz del Castillo, 1977, Vol. 3: 41–5, 47–9, 51–2). But this need not have been the
case. Without Olea, Cortés would have been captured and killed along with the other
68 Spaniards, the Indian allies would still have fled, and they would have had no reason
to return. In actual fact, they did return, but only because Cortés prevailed. Had he been
killed, factionalism among the remaining Spaniards would likely have split the camp,
forcing a withdrawal to the coast and a retreat to Cuba.
A counterfactual that opens up new possibilities, such as supplying Richard III with
his much sought-after horse, offers so many potential developments that causal
sequences rapidly multiply beyond anyone’s ability to predict with much assurance. In
the case of Cortés’s death, the counterfactual cuts off a known causal chain and, while
it gives rise to many new lines of action, it is definitive concerning the course of action
stopped, whereas altering Richard III’s circumstances creates new, unknown, and largely
unpredictable possibilities without necessarily effecting any significant change in the
known course of action. But where does this leave us in counterfactual analysis beyond
sharpening our focus on what is or is not pivotally causal?
The counterfactual experiment alters events or circumstances; the focus, however, is
not on facts per se, but on cause. Cause, however, is not a fact, but is the analytical assess-
ment of an historical relationship, the considered assessment of causality and conse-
quences. And while the cause of an event might seem obvious, a significant event is rarely
apparent from a given action, but rather from that action’s consequences, many of which
are known only far in the future. So while counterfactuals always focus on altering
pivotal causes, these are identifiable only as a result of their consequences, not in and of
themselves. And it is this historical notion of causation, akin to motivation rather than
to a direct mechanistic cause and effect, that precipitates many of the problems in his-
torical analysis.
To change a fact to create a counterfactual analysis, one must select out of the innumer-
able circumstances of the day a meaningful event or condition, not a physical event or
condition but rather one that is significant to the people involved. For an event to be
meaningful, it must have been taken into consideration by other historical actors and have
influenced their subsequent actions. Thus, the focus must be on facts as they appear to
the actors in that culture, not necessarily to the analyst. Moreover, since norms and
actions often differ, in identifying what is meaningful to actors in another culture, the
focus must be primarily on behavior rather than on verbal claims or written statements.
ANTHROPOLOGICAL THEORY 1(1)
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There are, however, real limits to our ability to assess actions, both historically and
ethnographically. Just as particle physics has the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle,
which states that a particle’s position and its velocity can each be determined but not
at the same time – hence the uncertainty – so too does ethnohistory have an uncertainty
principle.
The analyst is dependent upon the vagaries of record keeping, document survival, and
the good fortune of discovery to reveal historical events. The ethnographer, by contrast,
can actively inquire, although some things, such as wealth or ethnic background, may
be more difficult to discover during someone’s lifetime than posthumously. The import-
ance of an event or circumstance, however, depends not on the thing itself but on its
consequences, with the result that a significant occurrence can only be recognized his-
torically. For instance, ethnographers may focus on a murder in their village as the most
significant event because they believe it is important, not of itself, but in terms of its
longer-range consequences based on the impact such events have had elsewhere. But in
that same village, an Abraham Lincoln or an Adolf Hitler might be born and the eth-
nographers will have missed this more significant event because its importance cannot
be recognized immediately. It becomes important far later, as a result of the adult’s sub-
sequent actions. So, while ethnography offers the best data, history offers the best ques-
tions, and the two can never be completely brought together. And these difficulties are
magnified in the field of ethnohistory.
III. ETHNOHISTORY AND COUNTERFACTUALS
While much counterfactual analysis presumes ‘perfect knowledge’, these idealized coun-
terfactuals do not fit well with the non-Western groups with which ethnohistorians deal
because often the data are poor.2 While the focus on pivotal causes can be addressed with
a certain degree of confidence for modern Western history, where the data are generally
good, and even excellent for political actions, the same is often untrue outside the
Western, especially where there is no indigenous literate tradition.
Some counterfactuals are more plausibly situated in the recorded accounts of the event
in question, and it is important to differentiate between those for which the data are
fuller and those for which they are not. A counterfactual in the latter case is significantly
less compelling because there are many logical possibilities and little support in the his-
torical record to focus on the one proposed: they are, in effect, possibilities rather than
bona fide counterfactual probabilities.
In the case of ancient Mexico, virtually nothing can be answered by recourse to an
official transcript of debated actions and considered alternatives. The data are few and
often questionable, and all causal explanation hangs on how events and their significance
are reconstructed. And given the radically divergent cultural traditions of Spaniards and
Aztecs, even when the focus is on such a seemingly fixed event as Cortés’s landing on
the Veracruz coast, it is necessarily interpreted in quite different ways, because each side
does so from the perspective of its own cultural background. As a result, an analysis of
a pivotal event in the causal chain as seen within one cultural framework will not necess-
arily focus on the essential cause from the other cultural perspective. This is not fatal to
historical analysis, since, after all, the history as written is the historians’, not the
Spaniards’ or the Aztecs’, and it is their assessment of pivotal causality that is being evalu-
ated. But it does have a major impact on the data, since each culture will record (or
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ignore) events in light of their significance for itself, which will most probably produce
very different records that are then likely to skew the interpretation of the analyst.3
A great number of counterfactual examples rely on the unobservable, such as the
mental act of considering and selecting alternative courses of action (e.g. Clark, 1997).
But these intellectual considerations are seldom reflected in the Western historical record
of non-Western societies, which suggests that counterfactual interpretations that are
based on the private deliberations of an individual are unconvincing for such societies.
Ethnohistory tends to rely more on culturally congruent causes than on individual
decisions precisely for this reason. And as long as it offers recorded patterns of behavior,
it should yield plausible counterfactual analyses.
While ethnohistory does suffer from data limitations, it often benefits by the use of
comparison. Lacking considered alternative courses of action in the specific historical
case being studied, the tendency is to fall back on comparable examples. By examining
alternative choices made by other groups under similar circumstances, a range of alterna-
tives is presented that is effectively analogous to considered, recorded alternatives. More-
over, these have some advantage over considered, but rejected, alternatives, because the
former establish that these were viable alternatives adopted by someone and they offer
real consequences rather than merely counterfactually deduced ones. In effect, then,
counterfactuals are a form of projected comparative analysis that relies on similar situ-
ations in other places and other times, so that the likely outcomes of the choices not
made can be known.
IV. COUNTERCAUSALITY
One of the seeming paradoxes in counterfactual analysis is that while it focuses on chang-
ing causes, effects are more apparent than causes in historical records. Moreover, it is
effects that explanation seeks to account for, with causes invoked only in relation to them
as explanatory. Causes are not always obviously significant when they occur, and because
they are not always immediately perceived as important, they are less likely to be
recorded when they occur (and if they are, it is typically in a sketchier version) than are
effects. Moreover, there is little need to account for causes when they occur because they
need only be explained in relation to their effects. And the farther cause and effect are
separated in time, the less will be recorded and known of the former.
As odd as it may seem at first glance, distinguishing cause from effect is not always
easy. Every cause is, presumably, also an effect, yet we label them causes because of their
relationship to the effect of interest. Effects are the focal events and are thus defined as
effects, and once this has taken place, the search is then on for their causes. In essence,
effects are effects because we seek their causes, and we seek these because we want to
explain events that we see as having an impact on us. So first and foremost, pivotal events
are such because we consensually agree that they are. And we do so because we share
basic epistemological notions about history and causation, and the perception of pivotal
events is our common cultural currency.
Although effects are what is important in history, our counterfactual analyses focus
on cause because we believe we already know the crucial historical link between the
cause and its effects. So while counterfactuals nominally change causes, their real focus
is on the effect: the former is altered to change the latter in order to produce different
consequences. But while we know the effect, or it would not have been the important
ANTHROPOLOGICAL THEORY 1(1)
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focus of the inquiry, the same is not true of the cause. The cause is generally discovered
only by reasoning back from the effect.
Analytical history is the attempt to link effects to causes, but in feeling our way blindly
through the historical record, the most impressive bumps – in records as well as in impact
on the people – are the effects, and we then must tentatively work our way back to the
less impressive, more poorly recorded causes. And if this is not readily apparent in coun-
terfactual analyses, it is largely because most examples of that genre occur in data-rich
historical periods, such as modern Western history, where the difficulties in discerning
apparent causes are minimized.4 Moreover, because history, common understanding,
and causal reasoning emphasize a chronological sequence, the normal manner of presen-
tation, from the cause forward, obscures the fact that the route of research is from effect
backward to their causes. And it is precisely in ethnohistory, which typically deals with
peoples who have a relatively impoverished historical record, that the distortion of causal
reasoning is greatest. The data are the least secure and the likelihood that the cause
imputed in the analysis of a different culture is in error is the greatest.
V. CAUSAL REVISIONISM
The essence of traditional counterfactual analysis is the identification of the pivotal
causal points in an historical explanation and its alteration and the consequent change
in effect to illustrate the essentially contingent nature of history. If a cause is altered in
a counterfactual, then the established effect should change too, and if it does not, the
‘cause’ selected was not significant.
A major limitation of counterfactuals is not that it is impossible to reassess an his-
torical situation, alter the causes, and draw new logical consequences from them, but
rather that in doing so the anticipated counterfactual consequences will necessarily be
logical ones. That is, they are limited to the consequences one can reasonably foresee.
Unfortunately, the world frequently produces results that, while logical when seen after
the fact, all too often are not logically anticipated in advance. While historical analysis
emphasizes ex post facto causal reasoning in which both the probable and the improb-
able can be seen, counterfactual analysis demands predictive causal reasoning, which is
notoriously more difficult and generally does not capture the improbable. And because
counterfactual consequences can only be logical, anticipatable ones, counterfactual
examples are inherently impoverished in comparison to the richness of history as it is
lived, and its exercise eliminates much that actually happens in history.
But there is another way in which causes can be manipulated to produce new and
potentially provocative insights in historical analysis. Instead of altering a cause to
change its consequences, I propose changing the pivotal cause while holding the effect
constant. This causal revisionism is similar to counterfactual analysis in altering the cause
to produce a different explanation. But rather than accepting the standard interpretation
as true and assuming that a known causal link is being disrupted, causal revisionism chal-
lenges that interpretation, contests that link, and substitutes an alternative cause. This
is done, however, not to alter the effect and subsequent events, but to force a reinter-
pretation of these events as they are currently understood. I suggest this approach pri-
marily for two reasons. First, the primary data are often poor and, since effects tend to
be more securely documented in the historical record than causes, the former are more
apparent than the latter and we can have greater assurance of their accuracy. And, second,
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this approach eliminates the need for the problematic, predictive causal reasoning. In
causal revisionism, the attempt is to produce a more satisfactory revisionist analysis
through the use of reasoning drawn from counterfactuals to focus more on ‘how did this
effect arise’ than ‘would altering this cause change that effect’. Addressing the latter
requires a solid knowledge of the cause–effect relationship in historical settings of a sort
that often does not exist and which is not required in the former. One illustration of
this approach is the Cholollan (Cholula) massacre of 1519.
During the Conquest of Mexico, Cortés allied with the Tlaxcaltecs and then marched
one day south to the city of Cholollan. He was allowed to enter the city, but Marina, an
Indian woman who accompanied the expedition, learned of a Chololtec plot to mass-
acre the Spaniards, aided by a hidden Aztec army 50,000 men strong. She alerted Cortés,
who acted first. He assembled the Chololtecs in the main courtyard, placed armed
Spaniards at every entrance, and then massacred the enclosed and unarmed Indians.
Since Marina’s warning prompted Cortés to carry out a preemptive attack, a typical
counterfactual analysis might ask ‘what would have happened if Marina had not learned
of the plot or failed to inform Cortés of it’. All other things remaining constant, alter-
ing this cause would logically have led to the death of Cortés and presumably the aban-
donment of the Conquest of Mexico. But this counterfactual, logically reasoned result
need not have happened. Perhaps someone else would have uncovered the plot, or Cortés
might not have died so easily, or any of a number of unforeseeable events might have
intervened to alter the outcome. So instead of presuming that changing the cause as
proposed above would have flawlessly led to the failure of the Spanish Conquest in a
traditional counterfactual of questionable utility, I propose a different type of counter-
factual analysis, one that leaves the effect intact and therefore does not require the estab-
lishment of a tricky predictive line of reasoning. In this counterfactual, the Chololtecs
are not presumed to attack first and kill Cortés so that events subsequent to this are
entirely altered and demand logical predictions. Rather, I suggest that the cause be rein-
terpreted and the consequences be left intact so that only ex post facto reasoning is
required. Such an exercise would go as follows.
Despite nearly unanimous Spanish support for the above account of the Cholollan
massacre, it does not ring true. There probably was no Aztec army, as it is unlikely that
Moteuczoma had tens of thousands of soldiers available to send to Cholollan during
the agricultural season when most men were occupied. And even had the soldiers been
available, only three days elapsed between Cortés’s arrival in Cholollan and the alleged
reports of the Aztec force – barely enough time for a message to be sent to Tenochtitlan,
much less raise, arm, supply, and dispatch an army. Thus, an armed Aztec threat does
not seem credible, although Cortés may well have accused Moteuczoma of sending one
to keep him on the defensive. Moreover, the Spaniards also claim to have been alerted
to Chololtec duplicity by the presence of barricades and stones piled atop houses in
the city and concealed pits with sharpened stakes outside. The former is entirely
expected since nearby Tlaxcallan was an enemy, and the latter is almost certainly a
Spanish projection or misinterpretation. Concealed pits are relatively ineffectual against
infantry but they were the standard European counter to cavalry. So while the mounted
Spaniards might expect to encounter these, their use is otherwise unattested in the his-
torical sources, and they would have been entirely alien to Mexico as there were no
horses.
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There was a massacre, as reported, but of the Chololtecs, and this was probably an
intentional act by Cortés to destroy their leaders as a warning to other cities. There was
no sound logistical reason to go to Cholollan but there was animus between that city
and his new ally, Tlaxcallan, which threatened Cortés’s plans. Cholollan straddled the
main route between Tenochtitlan and Vera Cruz and would have threatened Cortés’s
rear once he continued his march. His need for reliable links to Vera Cruz had been
brought home to him by the rapid exhaustion of his shot and gunpowder in the battle
with Tlaxcallan. Vera Cruz was the only available source for these essential armaments
and his access could not be impeded. Moreover, having established an alliance with Tlax-
callan, Cortés felt less constrained in his dealings with Aztec allies.5 Thus, his decision
to go to Cholollan can best be understood as political – to secure his rear and his lines
of resupply, and chastise his friends’ enemies.
The assessment above is not mere fantasy. Even though it varies from the widely-
accepted conventional account, it is what facts and perspectives that are not generally
considered indicate happened. While we customarily think of counterfactuals as recon-
structions that are contrary to the facts, this is a counterfactual that goes against the data
as known, at least when one looks only at the Spanish accounts, and examines matters
somewhat more broadly and emphasizes other facts to posit an alternative causal scen-
ario. Thus I argue that the real counterfactual is the Spanish version, and that I am
proposing a fuller, more accurate, account.
Tetlock and Belkin (1996: 10–11) opened the theoretical door for this type of coun-
terfactual with an example in which a different cause was posited to frame an alterna-
tive theory, that of dinosaur extinction as a result of comet impact rather than a climatic
shift, a theory which has since been accepted by a majority of scholars in that field.
Tetlock and Belkin used the illustration only as an example and did not extend the
approach to human affairs, but the Cholollan example described here does. Moreover,
this is a true case of minimal rewrite. Rather than altering both causes and consequences,
this approach alters only the cause, leaving the event and its effects intact. That does not
mean that I am arguing that changing a cause will necessarily retain the same effect.
Rather, I argue that the actual cause of the Cholollan sequence of events was misunder-
stood and the presumed cause has been used to produce a specious causal link to the
historically known effect. So this causal revisionism argues for a reinterpretation of the
cause that led to the actual, experienced consequences and implicitly suggests that the
cause as traditionally conceived is not and perhaps would not, in actuality, have pro-
duced the effect we accept as historically true.
Adopting this strategy and not changing the effect emphasizes ex post facto reason-
ing rather than predictive, and does not lead to an altered causal line that stretches indef-
initely into the future as do conventional counterfactuals. Because this approach does
not alter the effect, there is no further consequence for the historical record, though there
will be for its interpretation. What is the practical difference between a counterfactual
example and a theoretical explanation that emphasizes the wrong facts and ignores those
that are crucial to another explanatory model? There is little, unless either case then tries
to go beyond the known consequences to argue an alternative reality. So the true effect
of a counterfactual lies in its deviation from established consequences and not from its
alteration of the initial facts because that – the suggestion of an alternative causal
mechanism – lies at the base of all revisionist history. This is precisely Cortés’s account
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of the Cholollan massacre – he posited something that did not happen (a planned mass-
acre of which Marina warned) and then fitted the subsequent events to that initial
‘cause’. My reinterpretation does not disturb the consequences, but substitutes what I
argue are the actual causal events for Cortés’s counterfactual ones.
But is this an isolated case of an infrequently encountered phenomenon? I do not
think so, though the exercise of critically examining such ‘well established’ causes may
be. To illustrate the point, let me introduce another example from the same Conquest.
After Cortés had returned to the Valley of Mexico for the final assault on Tenochtit-
lan, he built 13 brigantines to control the lakes and then sent to Tlaxcallan for 20,000
more warriors, as well as requesting soldiers from his allies within the valley. The Tlax-
caltec forces were led to Tetzcoco, where the Spaniards were headquartered, by Xico-
tencatl the Younger and Chichimecateuctli. But that night, Xicotencatl left Tetzcoco –
in one version, because he was in love with a woman in Tlaxcallan – and Cortés sent a
party of Spaniards in pursuit. He was seized and hanged for treason.
Xicotencatl was, in fact, killed, but the Spanish explanation is weak: other native
leaders left combat, often with their troops, and no action was taken against them, nor
was the majority of disaffected Spaniards harshly disciplined. The Spanish account satis-
fied legalistic reasoning by offering a cause that would justify the result, but an examin-
ation of the larger context suggests a political purpose behind Xicotencatl’s execution
and a different cause.
When Cortés first reached Tlaxcallan, power in the four confederated provinces rested
with the rulers of only two, and of those two, Tizatlan’s ruler, Xicotencatl the Elder, was
dominant. When his son and heir apparent, Xicotencatl the Younger, led the Tlaxcaltec
army against the Spaniards, the ruler of the competing province of Ocotelolco, Maxix-
catl, took the counter position and supported the Spaniards. When the Spaniards were
not quickly dispatched, support shifted to Maxixcatl’s side and he assumed greater
importance in the eventual coalition, while the fortunes of both Xicotencatls waned.
The political balance in Tlaxcallan was upset and Maxixcatl’s enhanced importance con-
tinued for the next year and a half, until he died of smallpox. Two other factors threat-
ened Ocotelolco’s prominence: Maxixcatl had sought to create a political link with the
Spaniards by giving one of his daughters to Juan Velásquez, but both were killed during
the flight from Tenochtitlan. And when Maxixcatl died, he was succeeded by a teenage
son who was not yet a formidable ruler. As a consequence, the fortunes of Xicotencatl
the Younger now significantly improved, while those of Cortés worsened. Had this hap-
pened earlier, it might have proven fatal to the entire Spanish enterprise. But now, a few
months into 1521, even though Xicotencatl’s domestic position was strengthened, events
external to Tlaxcallan made his support, though still important, less essential – notably
Cortés’s alliance with the Acolhua in the Valley of Mexico. Nevertheless, Xicotencatl the
Younger was now a greater threat to Cortés, and his death was likely a calculated Spanish
effort to eliminate a hostile ruler in Tlaxcallan and to improve the positions of those
with closer ties to Cortés.6
But did the events as I have briefly reconstructed them actually happen, and what
does either of these interpretations do that the conventional ones do not? In short, how
does this approach differ from good, solid historical analysis as currently practiced? His-
torical analysis that is canonically historical, that is, history that relies on the demon-
strable linkage of events from those events themselves cannot effectively adopt this
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approach. The standard interpretations are suggested by the data and are often the per-
spectives offered by the historical participants themselves, so if an alternative under-
standing is to be adopted, one must go beyond the traditional historical frame, for
alternative answers will generally not be found within it. What guides such reanalysis is
social context, a wider cluster of events and conditions than those historically or intuit-
ively evident from the immediate documentary record. Yet merely broadening the scope
of inquiry guarantees no answer: the potentially infinite social field must be delimited
to what is actually causal. And this is where social science research in the form of com-
parative analysis merges most naturally and gracefully with the historical enterprise.
Comparative analysis generates probablistic relationships between phenomena where
the causal links are not always intuitively obvious and cannot necessarily be deduced
from individual historical cases. Yet comparative analysis can convincingly show their
causal role. And since a major goal of historical reconstruction is to seek the unknown
cause of a known effect, comparative analysis broadens the alternative possibilities
beyond that (or those) proposed in the historical accounts, which may be self-serving
and are certainly constrained by the notions of cause of their time. This approach, then,
is not strictly counterfactual – it is, after all, the often-unrecorded cause that is contested,
not the recorded effect. Rather, it is documentarily counterfactual, which is a niche
opened by social science approaches in history.
It is difficult to say conclusively whether my reinterpretations of events are demon-
strably, factually, superior. But they do bring together more data, give a role for Indian
interests and perspectives that is largely absent from the Spanish version, and offer politi-
cal reasons for actions that are otherwise difficult to understand. Moreover, while they
do not alter the subsequent historical consequences, they do put them in an entirely
different light. They suggest that events arose from causes other than those convention-
ally offered and, if such is the case, they provide alternative perspectives on the Con-
quest in which Indian factionalism and infighting play a dominant role and therefore
cast the Conquest in an entirely different light, even with largely the same data, and
open up a new avenue of research, while the traditional views have long since become
entrenched, uncritically accepted, and have lost their intellectual challenge.
VI. CONCLUSION
In sum, counterfactual analysis is not merely entertaining fiction. Rather, by forcing the
analyst conceptually to alter the key events, it offers a sound approach for testing and
proofing causal arguments that rest upon the inherently limited historical data typical
of non-Western and contact situations. Even though the assessment cannot cover all con-
tingencies because it is limited to what can be logically foreseen, conceptually altering
the pivotal causes in one’s argument and then reassessing the sequence of events also pro-
vides a ready means of correcting and strengthening the analysis. But more than merely
testing historical arguments by changing causes that are presumed to alter effects which
then produce different consequences, the counterfactual approach provides an effective
means of challenging conventional interpretations, often long accepted. And it is especi-
ally useful in ethnohistory, where the historical record tends to be thin. Effects are typi-
cally recorded, but only rarely are their causes. Thus, the counterfactual approach is
useful in establishing what is, in fact rather than in convention, a pivotal event, and once
established, the stage is set for causal revisionism. The accepted cause can then be
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critically examined and, where pertinent, challenged, as these causes are far from certain,
resting as they typically do on far shakier documentation than the effects, and the
ascribed causes are often the assumptions of genuinely perplexed or self-serving outsiders
to the culture being chronicled. By examining these causes and comparing them to
similar situations elsewhere, and by assessing them in relation to an anthropological
understanding of the indigenous culture, the actions of all parties are placed in a broader
social context, and those actions can be reassessed to yield a more satisfactory interpre-
tation of the known consequences.
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Notes
1 It should be noted that, in this regard, propaganda is an effort to change the perceived
circumstance environment of the enemy through deception and to do so in a way that
causes him/her to act disadvantageously.
2 But how does the plethora of alternative choices in life square with the theoretical use
of counterfactuals? Niall Ferguson (1997: 87) claims that the only acceptable counter-
factual is not that which is merely premised on plausible alternative courses of action,
but on courses of action that were actually considered and are documented in the
historical record. His is not, of course, the only perspective, and Herrmann and
Fischerkeller (1996: 163) argue for the use of general motivations, such as a theory of
power-driven states, in framing counterfactuals. But, while Ferguson’s standard yields
the strongest counterfactual analysis, at least on an evidentiary basis, this claim, as
stated, implies that the validity of a counterfactual as a theoretical construct depends
on the data! However, the validity of a theory rests on its logic, not on its evidence,
which is recognizable only in relation to a theory and goes only to confirmation. So
while Ferguson’s approach yields more adequate evidence of a counterfactual’s plausi-
bility, it is not logically superior to cases of more speculative counterfactuals.
3 If our notions of historical causality are culturally determined, how does counter-
intuitive causation fit in? In part, counterintuitive causality is academic, as opposed
to common sense, or popular, causation. But it can shape popular views of causality
in history, and a well-established counterintuitive cause can force the type of per-
ceptual shift that I argue for, and it then becomes the popular perception.
4 Because we look at effects and try to link them to prior causes, any arbitrary limit on
historical inquiry, whether by pre-/post-Conquest divisions, centuries, or anything
else not delimited by a problem focus, is likely to separate the cause and the effect
and foster a misinterpretation of what we are seeing, e.g. a cause without its decapi-
tated effect may be taken as the effect.
5 For a fuller discussion of the Cholollan massacre and Marina’s role in it, see Hassig,
1998.
6 For a fuller discussion of the death of Xicotencatl, see Hassig, forthcoming.
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